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Abstract: One of  the main functions of  health care systems is to collect enough revenue to finance health expen-
ditures. This revenue can be obtained through different sources (taxes, social insurance contributions, out-of-pocket 
payments, donations), each of  which has different implications in terms of  equity. The equity implications of  
the different forms of  revenue collection are an important component of  health systems performance evaluation. 
The international evidence suggests that tax funded systems seem to be a more progressive health care financing 
mechanism than systems based on social insurance in low- and middle-income countries. However, progressivity 
results are sensitive to the choice of  ability to pay measures and, therefore, policy makers must be aware of  this 
fact when interpreting results of  studies on health care financing.
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¿Es posible que la financiación tributaria de la salud sea más regresiva que los sistemas 
basados en el aseguramiento social en países de ingreso bajo y medio? 
Resumen: Una de las funciones principales de los sistemas de salud es recaudar recursos suficientes para fi-
nanciar el gasto en salud. Estos recursos provienen de diversas fuentes (impuestos, donaciones, contribuciones a la 
seguridad social, gasto de bolsillo), las cuales pueden tener diferentes implicaciones en términos de equidad, compo-
nente clave en la evaluación del desempeño de los sistemas sanitarios. La evidencia internacional sugiere que en los 
países de ingresos bajos y medios los sistemas que recaudan los ingresos fundamentalmente vía impuestos tienden a 
ser más progresivos que los sistemas basados en aseguramiento. Sin embargo, este resultado depende de la medida 
de capacidad de pago elegida y, por lo tanto, los responsables de tomar decisiones deben tener en cuenta este hecho 
al interpretar los resultados de los estudios sobre la progresividad en el financiamiento de los sistemas de salud.
Palabras clave: financiamiento de sistemas de salud, progresividad, equidad.
Clasificación JEL: I11, I14
Est-il possible que le financement des systèmes de santé par des impôts soit plus ré-
gressif  que les systèmes fondés sur l’assurance sociale dans les pays à revenu faible et 
moyen?
Résumé: L’une des principales fonctions des systèmes de santé est celui de collecter des fonds suffisamment pour 
financer les dépenses de santé. Ces fonds ont une diversité des sources (taxes, contributions de sécurité sociale, dé-
penses de poche, donations), lesquels peuvent avoir des implications en termes d’équité, ce qui constitue un élément 
clé dans l’évaluation de la performance des systèmes de santé. L’expérience internationale montre que les pays à 
faible revenu et les pays à revenu moyens qui ont des systèmes de santé financés par les impôts, sont plus progres-
sistes par rapport aux systèmes de santé financés par l’assurance sociale. Toutefois, ce résultat dépend de la mesure 
choisie entant que capacité de paiement. Par conséquent, les responsables de la politique de santé doivent avoir très 
présent ce fait lors de leur interprétation des résultats des études concernant la progressivité dans le financement 
des systèmes de santé.
Mots-clés: financement des systèmes de santé, progressivité, équité.
Classification JEL: I11, I14
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Introduction
One of  the main functions of  health care systems is to collect enough re-
venue to finance health expenditures. This revenue can be obtained through 
different sources: general taxation (including direct and indirect taxes), social 
insurance contributions, out-of-pocket payments and even grants or dona-
tions (Mossialos & Dixon, 2002). Given that societies usually prefer to pro-
vide services according to some measure of  need, and at the same time it is 
argued that ability to pay should determine individuals’ contribution to health 
care financing, equity implications of  the different forms of  revenue collec-
tion are an important component of  health systems performance evaluation. 
One explicit concern is the extent to which health care financing promotes 
vertical equity, and particularly how “payments for health care rise or fall as 
a proportion of  a person’s income” (Wagstaff  & Van Doorslaer, 2000, pp. 
1819). Health care financing can be either progressive, if  payments rise as 
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income increases, regressive, if  the opposite happens, or proportional, if  the 
proportion of  income devoted to health care payments is the same regardless 
of  an individual’s income. 
An increasing awareness of  the impoverishing effects of  out-of-pocket 
payments in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) has motivated re-
forms that favour pre-payment mechanisms for health care financing, parti-
cularly general taxation and social insurance (McIntyre, 2007; Wagstaff, 2007). 
Because of  the structure of  taxation, it might be argued that tax funding of  
health care is likely to be more regressive than systems based on social insu-
rance in LMICs. However, evidence must be carefully analysed before any 
policy is implemented. Hence the purpose of  this essay is to describe how 
this argument can be assessed and to discuss how empirical evidence can be 
used to illuminate this issue. 
I. Measurement of health care financing progressivity
The most common way to assess the progressivity of  health systems 
financing is the Kakwani’s progressivity index, which measures the extent 
to which a source of  finance departs from proportionality (Wagstaff  & van 
Doorslaer, 2000; Kakwani, 1977). Even though this is not the only index 
available to analyze progressivity of  health care financing, this article will 
focus on the Kakwani index given its widespread application in empirical 
studies. Another index, proposed by the World Health Organization, is the 
index of  fairness of  financial contribution, but its ability to discriminate bet-
ween regressive and progressive systems has been disputed (Wagstaff, 2002). 
The Kakwani index can be calculated using the information in Figure 1. 
The Lorenz curve represents income inequality: it orders the population ac-
cording to the share of  income. If  income is distributed equally, the Lorenz 
curve would overlap the equality line; but if  income is distributed in such a 
way that the poorest 20% of  population has an income share of  less than 
20% and so on, then it would lie below the equality line, as in Figure 1. To 
measure income inequality, the Gini coefficient can be calculated as twice the 
area between the equality line and the Lorenz curve. On the other hand, the 
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concentration curve ranks individuals according to income and plots them 
against the cumulative proportion of  the contribution to health care finan-
cing. It is also possible to calculate the concentration index as twice the area 
between the equality line and the concentration curve. 
Figure 1. Equity in health care financing: Concentration and Lorenz curves
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Figure 1 illustrates the case in which the poorer households contribute disproportionately more than 
the rich to health care financing. For example, consider point A, which approximately corresponds 
to the 50% of population. In this case, the poorest half of the population receives lets say only 20% 
of income, but they contribute to 30% of total health care financing.  
 
The Kakwani index (K) is based on the difference between the Lorenz and concentration curves and 
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Source: Adapted from Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2000.
Figure 1 illustrates the case in which the poorer households contribute 
disproportionately more than the rich to health care financing. For example, 
consider point A, which approximately corresponds to the 50% of  popula-
tion. In this case, the poorest half  of  the population receives lets say only 
20% of  income, but they contribute to 30% of  total health care financing. 
The Kakwani index (K) is based on the difference between the Lorenz 
and concentration curves and can be calculated as follows: 
    K = C – G (1)
where C corresponds to the concentration index of  the contributions to 
healthcare financing and G to the Gini coefficient for income (before contri-
butions). The Kakwani index is bounded by –2 and 1. Negative values indi-
cate that the concentration curve lies above the Lorenz curve and therefore 
the financing system can be regarded as regressive, as is the case illustrated 
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in Figure 1. In a proportional system, both curves overlap and the index is 
equal to zero. Finally, positive values correspond to progressive systems (the 
concentration curve lies below the Lorenz curve). One attractive property of  
the Kakwani index is that if  revenue is collected from different sources, ove-
rall progressivity can be calculated as the weighted average of  the Kakwani 
index for the different sources, using the proportion of  each source to total 
revenue as weights (O’Donnell et al., 2008a).
It is important to emphasize that the index is not a replacement for the 
graphical analysis (O’Donnell et al., 2008a). For example, a Kakwani index of  
zero may be a consequence of  a system that is progressive for lower income 
persons but regressive as income increases (the Lorenz and concentration 
curves would cross), or the other way around. Evidently, each situation requi-
res different policy responses: while the first case may be considered accep-
table (policymakers may be willing to accept a system in which the poorest 
groups contribute proportionately less and richer groups contribute propor-
tionately more), the reverse situation could be judged as socially unaccepta-
ble. If  the Kakwani index is equal to zero because Lorenz and concentration 
curve cross, health policy that only relies on the index number could exacer-
bate the effect of  income inequality. 
With the previous results, it is possible to assess the progressivity of  tax 
funded health systems: they will be more or less progressive according to 
general tax progressivity, which in turn depends on the burden of  indirect 
and direct taxes. Direct taxes, like income, vehicle or profit taxes, are gene-
rally more progressive (Savedoff, 2004), while indirect taxes, like the value 
added tax, tend to be more regressive because they are levied on consump-
tion goods and low income households tend to expend proportionally more 
of  their income in those taxes. On the other hand, progressivity of  systems 
based on social health insurance depends on the way revenue is collected and 
the coverage of  insurance, and in principle there are no theoretical reasons to 
believe that tax funded systems are likely to be more regressive than systems 
based on social insurance in LMICs. As a matter of  fact, given that social 
insurance contributions are generally a percentage of  formal worker’s salaries 
(Savedoff, 2004) and there are contributions ceilings (Wagstaff, 2007), social 
insurance is potentially more regressive than a tax funded system.
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II. What does the empirical evidence suggest?
In high income countries, Wagstaff  et al. (1999) show that direct taxes 
are progressive in thirteen OECD countries, indirect taxes are regressive in 
all of  them, and social insurance is progressive in all but two countries where 
high income individuals can opt out the system (Germany and Netherlands). 
O’Donnell et al. (2008b) also found that in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, 
countries with systems based on social insurance, health care financing is 
slightly regressive. 
Regarding LMICs, O’Donnell et al. (2008b) found Kakwani indexes clo-
se to one for direct tax payments in countries like Bangladesh, the Philippi-
nes, Sri Lanka and Thailand, which means that these taxes are paid mainly by 
the richer individuals. Similarly, the index for indirect taxes is also positive, 
which means that they are also a progressive way to finance health care. This 
result is a consequence of  the fact that in these countries taxes are normally 
applied to luxury goods and basic consumption goods are exempt. Finally, 
the study also found a positive index for social insurance payments. Howe-
ver, the reason behind this finding is that coverage is generally restricted to 
formal working groups, and such a situation is far from an equitable outcome 
(Rannan-Eliya & Somanathan, 2006). 
In Palestine, governmental health insurance appears slightly progressive; 
but this effect is offset by out-of-pocket payments (approximately 40% of  
total health expenditures), resulting in an overall Kakwani index of  –0.0677 
for the West Bank and –0.0473 for the Gaza Strip in 2004 (Abu-Zaineh et 
al., 2008). Thus, progressivity in insurance could not compensate for the ne-
gative effect of  out-of-pocket payments given their dominance in the Pales-
tinian financing mix. In Africa, Cissé et al. (2007) analyze progressivity in 
health care finance in four West African capital cities: Abidjan (Ivory Coast), 
Bamako (Mali), Conakry (Guinea) and Dakar (Senegal). Given the absence 
of  public or private health insurance, out-of-pocket payments constitute a 
significant proportion of  total revenue and, as a consequence, the health care 
financing is regressive in all four cities: The Kakwani index ranges from –0.08 
in Dakar to –0.52 in Conakry. 
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Hajizadeh and Connelly (2009) analyse health care financing in Iran, 
where government expenditure accounts for 50% of  health care financing 
(30% of  resources correspond to taxation and 70% to natural resource sa-
les) and private expenditure for the remaining 50% (mainly private insurance 
and co-payments). The Kakwani index for total private health expenditure 
between 1995 and 2005 is always positive and relatively stable around 0.1, if  
household expenditure is used as the ability to pay variable. However, if  hou-
sehold income is used instead of  expenditures, results point towards a mildly 
regressive system: The Kakwani index is between –0.01 and –0.17, except in 
2004/2005 when the index is positive (0.00599). Following the authors, who 
prefer expenditure measures as these show less variance over time and are 
probably less underestimated than income (O’Donnell et al., 2008a), con-
sumer co-payments are progressive in both urban and rural areas of  Iran, 
while social insurance payments are generally progressive in rural areas but 
regressive in urban areas. 
Finally, in Colombia, social health insurance was introduced in 1993 to 
offer universal coverage to the population and to reduce out-of-pocket pa-
yments, which are widely regarded as one of  the most regressive financing 
mechanisms (McIntyre, 2007). To analyse the impact of  the reform, Castaño 
et al. (2002) calculated the Kakwani index for out-of-pocket payments before 
the reform and one and four years after its implementation. Despite some 
methodological shortcomings, they found a movement towards progressivity 
when using expenditures as the indicator of  ability to pay. However, simi-
larly to the Iranian findings, results indicate a regressive system if  income 
is used as the ability to pay indicator. On the other hand, in Brazil, a study 
by Ugá and Santos (2007) showed that the financing system (where 44% of  
total expenditure is tax funded) is slightly regressive: While direct taxes were 
progressive (basically income and vehicle taxes), this effect was offset by the 
regressive effect of  indirect taxes and out-of-pocket payments. The authors 
do not use the Kakwani index, but instead they calculate the contribution of  
each decile to health financing by source of  funding. 
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Conclusions
As the evidence shows, social insurance contributions and taxes are two 
different ways to finance health systems that entail different implications re-
garding the progressivity of  the system in LMICs. The Kakwani progressivity 
index and concentration curves can help policy makers to analyse the extent 
to which contributions fall or rise as income increases, and therefore they are 
valuable tools in the design and evaluation of  health reforms in LMICs. 
In the case of  tax funded systems, the evidence suggests that direct and 
even indirect taxes can be progressive sources of  financing in LMICs provi-
ded that indirect taxes are applied only to luxury goods and basic consump-
tion goods are exempt. For systems based on social insurance, the evidence 
is less conclusive. Even when the Kakwani index is positive in some LMICs, 
this does not necessarily mean that social insurance payments are a progressi-
ve source of  health care financing. On the contrary, it might reflect an access 
problem: richer groups pay proportionately more than poorer households 
but enjoy higher quality and access to health care. 
The findings in various LMICs indicate that tax funded systems seem to 
be a more progressive health care financing mechanism and the claim that 
they are likely to be more regressive than systems based on social insurance 
is not justified. However, as the results for Colombia and Iran demonstrate, 
it is important to note that progressivity results are sensitive to the choice of  
the ability to pay measure and, therefore, policy makers must be aware of  this 
fact when interpreting the results of  studies on health care financing. 
This paper presented a brief  introduction to the measurement of  equity 
implications of  different forms of  health care funding and a review of  some 
empirical findings. Future studies could do a more comprehensive empiri-
cal evaluation that might yield more definitive findings and a stronger guide 
for policy makers who are considering alternative funding arrangements for 
health care systems.
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